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Abstract
We believe that economic design and computational complexity—while already im-
portant to each other—should become even more important to each other with each
passing year. But for that to happen, experts in on the one hand such areas as social
choice, economics, and political science and on the other hand computational complexity
will have to better understand each other’s worldviews.
This article, written by two complexity theorists who also work in computational so-
cial choice theory, focuses on one direction of that process by presenting a brief overview
of how most computational complexity theorists view the world. Although our immedi-
ate motivation is to make the lens through which complexity theorists see the world be
better understood by those in the social sciences, we also feel that even within computer
science it is very important for nontheoreticians to understand how theoreticians think,
just as it is equally important within computer science for theoreticians to understand
how nontheoreticians think.
1 Introduction
Predictions are cheap. Our cheap prediction is:
Economic design and computational complexity should and will in the future be even
more deeply intertwined than they currently are.
∗This work was done in part while on a sabbatical stay at ETH Zu¨rich’s Department of Computer Science,
generously supported by that department.
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What is a bit less cheap is working to make predictions come true. If the prediction is
broad or ambitious enough, doing that is often a task beyond one paper, one lifetime, or
one generation.
Nonetheless, in this article we will seek to make a small contribution toward our predi-
cation’s eventual realization. In particular, as complexity theorists who have for more than
a decade also been working in computational social choice theory, we have seen first-hand
how deeply important computational social choice theory and computational complexity
have been to each other. And the “to each other” there is not written casually. As argued
in a separate paper [Hem18], the benefit of the interaction of those areas has been very
much a two-way street.
However, to increase the strength and quality of the interaction, and to thus reap even
more benefits and insights than are currently being gained, a needed foundation will be
mutual understanding. After all, even the different subareas of computer science have quite
different views of what computer science is about, and sometimes it seems that computer
scientists don’t understand even each other’s worldviews.
As complexity theorists, we can expertly address only one direction in which explana-
tion is needed: trying to explain the—perhaps strange to those who are not complexity
theorists—way that complexity theorists tend to view the world. We sincerely hope that
the reciprocal directions will be addressed by appropriate experts from the many other
disciplines whose practitioners are part of the study of economic design.
Beyond that, we also embrace and somewhat generalize a hope that for the case of
(computational) social choice is expressed in the above article [Hem18]: We hope that in
time there will be a generation of researchers who are trained through graduate programs
that make students simultaneously expert in computational complexity and one of the
other disciplines underpinning economic design—researchers who in a single person achieve
a shared understanding of two areas. But for now, most researchers have as their core
training one area, even if they do reach out to work in—or work with experts in—another
area. And thus we write this article to try to make as transparent as we can within a few
pages the crazy, yet (to our taste) just-right, way that complexity theorists view the world.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 further discusses the need
for, and the importance of improving, mutual understanding. That section argues that the
way that complexity theorists view the world is rarely understood even by the other areas of
computer science, and that the areas of computer science themselves are separated by huge
cultural gaps. Section 3 presents what we feel is the heart of how computational complexity
theorists view the world, which is:
We as complexity theorists believe that there is a landscape of beautiful mathematical
richness, coherence, and elegance—waiting for researchers to perceive it better and
better with the passing of time—in which problems are grouped by their computational
properties.
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2 The Need for Creed: Why Understanding Each Other Is
Hard yet Needed and Important
In this section, we briefly mention some cultural chasms between complexity and social
choice—and even between complexity and other areas of computer science—and suggest
that shrinking or removing those chasms is important: Understanding between collaborators
is of great value to the collaboration.
2.1 Spanning to Computational Social Choice, Economics, and Beyond
In this section, we will focus on computational social choice, as that is the particular facet
of economic design that the authors are most familiar with.
This paper will not itself present the many ways that computational complexity and
computational social choice have interacted positively and in ways that benefit both ar-
eas. As mentioned above, a separate paper [Hem18] already makes that case, for example
pointing out: how computational social choice has populated with problems such classes as
the Θp2 level of the polynomial hierarchy and NP
PP; how computational social choice has
provided the first natural domain in which complexity theory’s search-versus-decision sepa-
ration machinery could be applied; how that application itself gives insight into how to best
frame the manipulative-attack definitions in computational social choice; how complexity’s
“join” operation has been valuable in proving the impossibility of obtaining certain impossi-
bility results in computational social choice theory; how the study of online control yielded
a completely new quantifier-alternation characterization of coNP; and much more, such as
how important a role approximation, dichotomy results, and parameterized complexity have
played in computational social choice.
It in fact is quite remarkable how strongly complexity has helped the study of compu-
tational social choice, and is even more remarkable—since this is the direction that might
not have been apparent beforehand—how strongly computational social choice has helped
the study of computational complexity theory. And most remarkable of all is that these
results have usually been obtained by researchers from one side, although ones who were
very interested in the other side. This clearly is a pair of areas that already is showing
very strong content interactions and mutual benefits. Think of how much more waits to
be seen and achieved when computational social choice theorists/social choice theorists and
complexity theorists deepen their understanding of each other.
Some might worry about the “computational” in “computational social choice” above—
namely, worrying that computational social choice is such a young area that no one is
“native” to it. We disagree. It is true that much of the key, early work on this area—as it
was emerging as an area with a distinct identity—was done by researchers whose training
was in operations research, logic, artificial intelligence (AI), theoretical computer science,
economics, social choice, political science, or mathematics. But already a generation of
students, now in their 20s and 30s, has been trained whose thesis work was on computational
social choice theory: researchers whose “native” area and identity is—despite the fact that
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their thesis advisors view themselves as at their core part of one of the older areas just
listed—that they are computational social choice theory researchers. This is a very good
development, and yet we are asking even more: Now that the area has its own identity, one
can hope to grow researchers whose core training and identity embraces both that young
area and the area of computational complexity.
2.2 Spanning to Other Computer-Science Areas
It is often discussed within computer science departments whether computer science is even
a coherent discipline. After all, if one thinks about which other department the areas of
computer science feel kinship to, for theoreticians that generally would be mathematics, for
systems people that generally would be electrical and computer engineering, for symbolic
AI people that often would be one of brain and cognitive sciences, linguistics, philosophy,
or psychology, and for vision/robotics AI people that might be mechanical engineering,
electrical and computer engineering, or visual science.
The cultural differences are also stark. For example, taking as our examples the two
subareas of computer science that are most strongly represented in computational social
choice research—AI and theory—we have the following contrasts in culture. Anonymous
submissions at the main conferences versus submissions with the authors’ identities open.
Intermediate feedback and rebuttals at the main conferences versus no such round. Authors’
names generally being ordered by contribution versus authors names always being listed
alphabetically.1 Large hierarchical program committees versus small almost-flat program
committees. And that listing is not even mentioning the issue of the contrasting content of
the areas, or their differing views on conference versus journal publication.
Almost any theoretical computer scientist will have stories of how sharply his or her
perspective has differed from those of his or her nontheory colleagues, e.g., a nontheory
colleague who firmly felt that 8x8 chess—not NxN chess [Sto83] but actual 8x8 chess—
under the standard rules (which implicitly limit the length of any game) is a great example
of asymptotic complexity, and who advised the theoretician to go use Google to learn more
about this. We suspect that nontheory computer science faculty members could write quite
similar sentences—with different examples—from their own points of view, regarding the
things theory faculty members say.
So even the subareas of computer science have some gaps between them as to under-
standing, or at least have rather large agree-to-disagree differences. Our hope is that,
regarding the former, this short article may be helpful.
1One of us once asked a colleague, who at one point was the president of AAAI, whether he, upon seeing
a paper with a very large number of authors with them all in alphabetical order, would really assume that
Dr. Aardvark had made the largest contribution. The colleague looked back as if he’d been asked whether he
really believed that 1+1 = 2 and said that he of course would. In fact, in the different area within computer
science known as systems, there is a running semi-joke—that excellently corresponds with reality—that one
can tell how theoretical a given systems conference is by looking at what portion of its papers list the authors
in alphabetical order; in fact, there is a very funny joke-paper [App92] that quantifies this—more rigorously
than the earlier part of this sentence does—to prove that the POPL conference is quite theoretical.
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We mention, however, that we do not agree that anything said above shows that com-
puter science is not a coherent discipline. To us, and in this we are merely relating an
important, much loved insight that has been around in one form or another for many
decades [Knu79, Har87], there is a unifying core to the field of computer science: algorith-
mic thought (and the study of algorithms). That core underpins AI, systems, and theory,
and makes computer science an at least decently coherent discipline.
3 A Core Belief, and Its Expressions, Interpretations, and
Implications
3.1 A Core Belief
We feel that a core view—in fact, the core view—of complexity theorists is the following
(phrased here both as a profession of belief and as a statement of what is believed).
[Core Belief We as complexity theorists believe that:] There is a landscape of
beautiful mathematical richness, coherence, and elegance—waiting for researchers to
perceive it better and better with the passing of time—in which problems are grouped
by their computational properties.
If the subfield can be said to have a creed, this is it.
By saying that complexity theorists feel this, we don’t mean to suggest that it is exclusive
to them. In a less computational vein, the great mathematician Paul Erdo˝s spoke of “The
Book,” which holds the most elegant proof of each mathematical theorem. He famously
said, “You don’t have to believe in God, but you should believe in The Book,” and surely
viewed as moments of true joy those when a proof so beautiful as to belong in the book
was discovered. And the great computer scientist Edsger Dijkstra is traditionally credited2
with this lovely, insightful comment:
Computer Science is no more about computers than astronomy is about telescopes.
— E. Dijkstra
2The quote is attributed to him in works of others as early as 1993 [Hai93, p. 4], though attributing the
quote to Dijkstra is disputed, as Michael Fellows published a very similar comment in a 1991 manuscript
that appeared in a 1993 conference proceedings and published the identical quotation in 1993 in a Computing
Research News article joint with Ian Parberry.
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Though different people interpret that quotation in different ways, we have always inter-
preted it to suggest almost precisely what our core belief is expressing. Indeed, the quota-
tion’s implicitly drawn parallel between astronomy studying the structure of the universe
and computer scientists studying a similarly majestic structure is extremely powerful. And
things are made even more pointed in the 1991 version by Michael Fellows, which follows the
same sentiment as that of the quotation with, “There is an essential unity of mathematics
and computer science.”
3.2 The Heretics
Having read Section 3.1, theoretical researchers from any field may think, “Well, duh!”
That is, they may think that the core belief is obvious, and wonder who could possibly
think anything else.
The answer is that quite a large portion of the field computer science thinks something
else. This was most famously expressed in a 1999 “Best Practices Memo” [PSU99] that was
published in Computing Research News, the newsletter of a prestigious group, the Com-
puting Research Association, of over two hundred North American organizations involved
in computing research, including many universities. To this day, that memo is on the
Computing Research Association’s web site as a best practices memo ([PSU17], although
there certainly has been strong pushback on some of its points [Var09, For09]). The most
jump-off-the-page lines in that memo are these:
... experimentalists tend to conduct research that involves creating compu-
tational artifacts and assessing them. The ideas are embodied in the artifact,
which could be a chip, circuit, computer, network, software, robot, etc. Arti-
facts can be compared to lab apparatus in other physical sciences or engineering
in that they are a medium of experimentation. Unlike lab apparatus, however,
computational artifacts embody the idea or concept as well as being a means
to measure or observe it. Researchers test and measure the performance of the
artifacts, evaluating their effectiveness at solving the target problem. A key
research tradition is to share artifacts with other researchers to the greatest ex-
tent possible. Allowing one’s colleagues to examine and use one’s creation is a
more intimate way of conveying one’s ideas than journal publishing, and is seen
to be more effective. For experimentalists conference publication is preferred
to journal publication, and the premier conferences are generally more selective
than the premier journals... In these and other ways experimental research is at
variance with conventional academic publication traditions.
Underlying this is a worldview that is very different than that of most theoreticians.
The worldview is that software systems and devices are often so complex that trying to
theoretically capture their behavior and properties is hopeless, and we instead need to
experiment on them to make observations. For example, that view might suggest that
operating systems are so enormous and complex that we can’t really capture or understand
precisely their behavior.
6
Yet theoreticians think otherwise. Theoreticians dream of a time when essentially all
programs—of any size—will have a rigorous, formally specified relationship between their
inputs and their actions/outputs, and when we will seek to prove that the programs satisfy
those relationships (insofar as can be done without running aground on undecidability is-
sues). Perhaps that time will be decades or centuries away for extremely complex programs,
but we believe it will come. And in fact, real progress—for example thanks to advances in
automated theorem-proving/automated reasoning—has been made in the past few decades
on verifying that even some quite large programming systems meet their specifications.
In brief, we don’t think that because software systems are complex one can only experi-
ment on them as if they were great mysteries; rather, we think that, precisely because they
are so complex, the field should increase its efforts to formally understand them, including
working on building the tools and techniques to underpin such an understanding.
To be fair to the above-quoted memo, it carefully had a very separate coverage in which
it described what theoreticians do. But to many theoreticians, viewing computing systems
as too complex to theoretically analyze—and more suitable for experimenting on—is far
too pessimistic, at least as a long-term view.
Is our Core Belief utterly optimistic? Not purely so. It is broadly optimistic, in what it
believes exists, though to be frank the landscape it is speaking of is typically more about
problems and classes than about analyzing operating systems. But embracing the Core
Belief does not mean that one must be delusional as to time frames. For example, in
Gasarch’s 2012 P versus NP poll [Gas12], only 53% percent of those polled felt that P
versus NP would be resolved by the year 2100. 3% thought it would never be resolved, and
5% said they simply did not know when/if it will be resolved.
An astounding 92% of the polled theoreticians believe that it will eventually be resolved,
even though currently no path for imminently resolving the question is in sight (see also the
very grim possibility mentioned in the 1970s by Hartmanis and Hopcroft [HH76]: that the
question might be independent of the axioms of set theory).3 Theoreticians have generally
taken to heart Sir Thomas Bacon’s 1605 comment from The Advancement of Learning :
They are ill discoverers that think there is no land, when they can see nothing but
sea. — Thomas Bacon
3.3 Landscape and Classification
So what is this landscape that the Core Belief speaks of? And how can we bring it into
better focus?
3Note added: In Gasarch’s just-published 2019 P versus NP poll [Gas19], those figures of
53%/3%/5%/92% have shifted to 66%/9%/0%/91%. Gasarch’s comment on that is that “[the shift from
53% to 66%] amazes me because, since 2012, there has been little (no?) progress on resolving P =?NP. Note
that in 2019 more people [9%] thought it would never be solved than in 2012 [3%] or 2002 [5%]” [Gas19].
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3.3.1 Axes and Granularity of Classification
The landscape is one where each problem is located by its classification in terms of various
measures. What is its (asymptotic, of course) deterministic time cost? What is its deter-
ministic space cost? What are its nondeterministic costs? Its costs in various probabilistic
models? What about in nondeterministic models that forbid ambiguity (i.e., that have
at most one accepting path) or that polynomially bound the ambiguity? What about in
quantum computing models and biocomputing models? How well can the problem be—in
various senses—solved by heuristics or approximations? What types of circuit families can
capture the problem? What types of interactive proof classes can capture the problem?
And that is just a quick start to listing aspects of interest. The number of interesting
dimensions along which problems can be classified is already large, and continues to grow
with time. Our landscape is not a physical one, of course, but is a rich world of mathematical
classification.
The granularity with which we group the “locations” in this world itself is interesting.
Complexity theorists typically focus on equivalence classes of problems, linked by some
type of reduction. For example, the NP-complete problems are all those problems that
are many-one, polynomial-time interreducible with the problem of testing the satisfiability
of boolean formulas. One can think of the NP-complete sets as an extremely important
feature of the landscape. Yet one can also view the landscape with an interest in other
degrees of granularity. The class of NP-Turing-complete sets for example contains all the
NP-complete sets, and may well contain additional sets [LM96], since Turing reductions are
a more powerful reduction type than many-one reductions. Going in the other direction,
the class of sets that are polynomial-time isomorphic to boolean satisfiability may well be a
strict subset of the NP-complete sets, and it is known to be a strict subset with probability
one relative to a random oracle [KMR95].
Briefly put, complexity classes usually are defined by placing a bound on some key
resource, e.g., NP is the class of sets that can be accepted by polynomially time-bounded
nondeterministic computation. Complexity classes in some sense are upper bounds on some
dimension of complexity. Reductions are yardsticks by which sets can be compared. If a set
A reduces to a set B by some standard reduction type, we view A as being “easier or not
too much harder” than B, with the details depending on what power the reduction itself
possesses. There are now a huge number of intensely studied reduction types, capturing
such notions as, just as examples, the amount of time or space the reduction is itself allowed
to use; whether the reduction is a single query or multiple ones and if the latter how they
are used and whether they are sequential or parallel; and to what extent the reduction itself
can act nondeterministically. And completeness for complexity classes combines a class
with a reduction type, identifying those sets in the class that are so powerful that every set
in the class reduces to them by the given reduction type. In some sense, the completeness
equivalence class of a complexity class groups together those problems, if any such problems
exist (and some parts of the landscape perhaps lack complete sets [Sip82, Gur83, HH88,
HJV93]), that distill the essence of the potential hardness of the class—they share the same
underlying computational challenge. As such, they help complexity theorists focus on what
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the source of a problem’s complexity is.
The joyful obsession and life’s work of complexity theorists is to better understand this
landscape. This often is done though classifying where important problems—or groups of
problems—fall. Far more rarely yet vastly more excitingly, complexity theorists find new
relationships between the different dimensions of classification, e.g., by showing that every
set in the polynomial hierarchy Turing reduces to probabilistic polynomial time [Tod91] or
by showing the class of sets having interactive proofs is precisely deterministic polynomial
space (PSPACE) [Sha92].
3.3.2 Classification Is Done for Insights into the Landscape
The Core Belief and the previous section should hint at a truth that often is surprising to
people who are not complexity theorists. That truth is that complexity theorists want to
classify problems as part of the ongoing attempts to better understand the landscape of
problem complexity. And in particular, we are interested in doing that even for problems
where the classifications we are trying to distinguish between don’t in practice differ in what
they say about how quickly a problem can be solved.
For example, complexity theorists think that it is a rather big deal whether a problem—
if it is an interesting one, such as about logic—is complete for double exponential time
versus for example being complete for triple exponential space. This isn’t because we think
that complete problems for double exponential time are going to be easy to quickly solve.
It is because we want to clarify where interesting problems fall in the landscape.
Looking at the other extreme, there is a huge amount of research into complexity classes
(such as certain uniform circuit classes and logarithmic-space classes) all of which are con-
tained in deterministic polynomial time. Yet to most people, deterministic polynomial time
already is the promised land as to computational cost. Nonetheless, smaller classes are
intensely studied, to better understand the rich world of complexities that exist there, and
which problems have which complexities, although in fairness we should mention that some
of this type of study is also motivated by the issue of whether the problem can or cannot
be parallelized [GHR95].
But the real kicker here is that even if SAT solvers turn out to be able to do stun-
ningly well on NP-complete problems, complexity theorists still will view the notion of
NP-completeness as being of fundamental importance to the landscape. This is not because
we don’t care about how well heuristics can do—that too is a dimension of the landscape,
and thus something on which rigorous results are important and welcome—but rather we
think that the notion of NP-completeness itself is one of the greatest beauties of the land-
scape, and is natural and compelling in so very many ways.4
4This article is not on the subject of how well heuristics can do on NP-complete problems, or the strengths
and limitations of SAT solvers. On one hand, there are theoretical results showing that polynomial-time
heuristics cannot have a subexponentially dense set of errors on any NP-hard problem unless the polynomial
hierarchy collapses. And if someone says they have a SAT solver that works on any collection of NP problems
they ever have encountered, it is interesting to point out to them that factoring numbers that are the product
of two large primes can be turned into a SAT problem, and so their amazing SAT solver should be able to
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To take as an example one of the most beautiful examples of how profound the issue is of
whether NP-complete sets belong to P, i.e., whether P = NP, we mention that a not widely
known paper by Hartmanis and Yesha [HY84] is in effect showing that whether humans
can be perfectly replaced by machines in the task of finding and presenting particular-sized
mathematical proofs of theorems—loosely put, the issue of whether humans have any chance
of having any special creativity and importance in achieving mathematical proofs—can be
characterized by the outcome of such basic landscape questions as whether P and NP differ,
and whether P and PSPACE differ.
4 Conclusion
To end as we started, we believe that economic design and computational complexity should
become even more important to each other with each passing year, but that an improved
mutual understanding of the areas’ worldviews is important in making that happen. In
that spirit, this article sets out the optimistic worldview that we believe is held by most
computational complexity theorists. And the most central part of that worldview is that we
as complexity theorists believe that there is a landscape of beautiful mathematical richness,
coherence, and elegance—waiting for researchers to perceive it better and better with the
passing of time—in which problems are grouped by their computational properties.
That is not to say that we believe that the greatest open issues within that land-
scape will be resolved within our lifetimes. But we believe that—just as that landscape
has already been seen to have utter surprises in what it says regarding language the-
ory [Sze88, Imm88], interactive proofs [LFKN92, Sha92], branching programs and safe-
storage machines [Bar89, CF91], approximation [ALM+98], the power and lack of power of
probabilistic computation [NW94, IW97, Tod91], and much more—the landscape contains
countless more surprises and advances that will be reached in years, in decades, and in
centuries, and we believe that many of them will be in the important, rapidly growing areas
at the intersection of economic design and computational complexity.
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break RSA and make them rich... yet no one has yet been able to make that work. On the other hand,
SAT solvers undeniably do perform remarkably well on a great range of data sets. For discussion of most of
the issues just mentioned, and how they can be at least partially reconciled, see for example the article by
Hemaspaandra and Williams [HW12].
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